our brothers in singapore worried we forget them?

This is an article one of them, but those charges true? Evil Are we in malaysia? Hopefully this point that we are more familiar with them there that feels as if we forget about them and threatened them,..... accept “fda if aint broken….”

  “Behind every surviving institution is its purpose and history. Purpose conveys the idea of relevance while history is full of ups and downs and is not necessarily a guide to the future. The multilateral Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) emerged as a successor to a bilateral defence pact during a troubled period of maritime Southeast Asia's history, and survived despite chronic questioning about its purpose. Today, it still has five members, and it still ain't broke, although the recent Asian crisis did create a scare. This paper examines the setting and dynamics involved in the FPDA, and assesses its relevance in the new millennium.

Common Bonds, Enduring Fears

Malaya - a federation of nine small states - became independent from Britain in 1957. Two years later, Britain permitted Singapore to be self-governing. The military bases on the island accommodated not only British forces but also Australian and New Zealand forces (the ANZUK forces). As well, the British continued to help Malayan counter-insurgency forces fight the communist remnants. The Butterworth air base, opposite Penang island in peninsular Malaya, continued to be used by ANZUK air forces while Johor in the south was the location for joint jungle training. British forces were also stationed in British North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and the oil-rich protectorate, Brunei.

Thus, when Indonesia under President Sukarno began to oppose Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's idea of an enlarged federation (to include Singapore, Brunei, British North Borneo and Sarawak), ANZUK forces were in place in Malaya as well as in the remaining British colonial territories. From one perspective, it can be argued that the proposed new federation, Malaysia, would help to stabilise the sub-region and therefore provide security to the widely scattered Indonesian archipelago. From Sukarno's perspective, however, Malaysia was a neo-colonial creation. Moreover, Sukarno had not been consulted! Sukarno was also facing domestic problems and he wanted to divert attention to foreign policy. His tirades increasingly took on a threatening tone.

In this atmosphere, the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) provided a security umbrella for independent Malaya. AMDA (unlike the future FPDA), was a bilateral defence agreement. When Malaysia was formally created in 1963 (without Brunei's inclusion), AMDA - renamed the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement -continued to provide some measure of security to the new federation. Just as important, ANZUK forces were still based in Butterworth and Singapore. These forces helped Malaysia resist Indonesia's policy of "Confrontation" which included military action or terrorist activities in Johor, Singapore, and Sarawak.

Confrontation engendered an enduring fear of Indonesia as a regional source of instability under certain conditions, such as internal challenges to its unity and the emergence of an "adventurous" ultra-nationalist or religious leader (or leadership). But this common fear did not diffuse domestic tensions between the Malay-dominated central government in Kuala Lumpur (the Malaysian capital) and the Chinese-dominated government in the city-state of Singapore. Racial tensions followed. In August 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia.

Externally, Britain had meanwhile decided by 1967 to pull out its military forces "east of Suez". Given that Confrontation had by then been effectively countered, and also given that a process of conciliation had begun between Indonesia and Malaysia, the dangerous years could be said to have passed for Malaysia and Singapore. But, because the long history of security cooperation among British, Australian, New Zealand and Malayan/Malaysian forces had always been mutually satisfying, both Malaysia and Singapore were keen to keep some form of this "it ain't broke" security structure going. So were the Australians and New Zealanders. Canberra, in particular, posited forward defence as its strategic doctrine.

By 1971, just such a "coalition of the willing" had emerged - the FPDA - in a formula that imposed no undue strain or obligation on any party. Defence ministers of the five nations met in London on 16 April 1971 to conclude the formation of the FPDA which obliges them to consult each other in the event of an external aggression or threat of such attack against Malaysia and Singapore. There was no requirement for physically stationing multinational forces in Malaysia or Singapore. On 1 September 1971, the five nations decided to form the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) within the framework of the FPDA to assume responsibility for the air defence of Malaysia and Singapore. Finally, on 1 December 1971, Malaysia and Singapore separately concluded bilateral exchange of notes with the other three partners of the FPDA to effect the new defence arrangements.1

The key term in this multilateral successor to the bilateral AMDA is the plural noun, "arrangements". Yet, many commentators continue to refer, incorrectly, to the "Five Power Defence Arrangement". The FPDA, as described above, is a set of arrangements that allow two parties or more to consult and cooperate under the FPDA rubric in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore. In this sense, this "FPDA minus x" formula predated the famous "ASEAN minus x" formulation! This in-built flexibility has proven useful in practice. For example, the most geographically distant partner, Britain, nevertheless can still assemble the most formidable array of assets for major FPDA exercises. But its absence during a number of years was not seen as a lack of commitment.

Flexibility apart, gradualism was another FPDA hallmark. For a whole decade, the IADS was about the most active component of the FPDA, with air defence exercises conducted annually since 1972. Then, in 1980, the leaders of the five countries decided to initiate regular land and naval exercises. Between 1981 and 1986, Australia and New Zealand alternately hosted annual FPDA land exercises. In 1987, Malaysia hosted its first land exercise and in 1989, Singapore was the host. The 1990 land exercise was held in Malaysia but hosted by Britain. Sea exercises, also held since 1981, are alternately hosted by Malaysia and Singapore in the South China Sea.2

Apart from the usefulness of the various exercise series, the FPDA - especially in the early years - provides the teeth for a vital aspect of the defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) located at Butterworth, under an Australian commander. This deliberate decision was a practical one, given the unspoken discomfort Malaysian and Singaporean leaders would have in having an IADS commander from either country.

Certainly, the FPDA played a useful role in confidence-building between Malaysia and Singapore, especially in the early post-separation years when bilateral external security cooperation between the two countries (other than the unbroken internal security cooperation) was all but absent. Importantly, the creation of the IADS symbolised the indivisibility of the defence of peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. Illustrative of the FPDA's gradual evolutionary nature, the IADS itself has proven to be adaptive, and is being transformed into the Integrated Area Defence System. This name change reflects the emphasis on joint activities.

Finally, on the issue of deterrence, although leaders of the two regional countries have not pretended that the legacy of Indonesia's Confrontation had affected their security perceptions, the FPDA is best seen as providing a form of "potential" deterrence, in which no actual enemy is identified.3 Some observers have referred to the "psychological deterrence" provided by the FPDA; others note that Australian F/A-18 fighter jets based in Tindal in northern Australia are only a few hours flight time from the sub-region.

FPDA in the New Millennium

If the several features of the FPDA proved its resilience since 1971, predicated on commonsensical "it ain't broke" premises and gradual enhancement comfortable to all its members, what possible challenges to its relevance may be identified in the new millennium?

The impression should not be given that the FPDA did not have its share of structural weaknesses, political difficulties, intra-mural tensions and viability questions. In the first place, the external powers are not obligated to come to the defence of the two regional powers since the FPDA carries no treaty obligations. In addition, although the IADS does have a command structure, the FPDA itself does not. Politically, although Indonesia was not identified as the potential threat to be deterred, it cannot be said to be enthusiastic about the existence of a set of defence arrangements which arose in the aftermath of Confrontation. Much credit could be given to the previous Suharto administration for its passive acquiescence in accepting Malaysia and Singapore's membership of the FPDA as part and parcel of the regional web of bilateral and multilateral security links outside the ASEAN framework. One may also speculate that Brunei's "lukewarm" interest in the FPDA has been due to sensitivity to Indonesia's possible reaction. One novel Indonesian attempt to revisit the FPDA concept arose in 1990 when former foreign minister Mochtar Kusuma-atmadja suggested in a regional journal article that the FPDA be gradually disbanded over a period of five years and a new Three-Power Defence Arrangement be created comprising only Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. He felt that the "abandonment of the [FPDA] by Malaysia and Singapore would immeasurably strengthen the political and psychological basis for the continued growth of a three-power ASEAN military cooperation".4 He added that Australia could participate in the proposed pact's joint exercises as a "friendly neighbouring power".5

Problems in the political relationship between Malaysia and Singapore have also affected the FPDA. The most recent was Malaysia's last-minute withdrawal from a major maritime exercise (Stardex) in 1998. Kuala Lumpur said its decision was a result of the Asian economic and financial crisis but observers noted that it came at a time when Malaysia-Singapore relations were affected by a number of issues. However, Malaysia resumed its participation of Stardex in 1999.

There is always the question of sustaining the interest of external partners in any security arrangement. The FPDA has been no exception. Britain did not take part in the air defence/maritime exercise Lima Bersatu for more than a decade and only resumed its participation since 1988. The present Labour government in Britain shows its interest in engagement with FPDA partners but it cannot be said that future governments - Labour or Conservative -will be similarly disposed. New Zealand's involvement has been comparatively modest and indeed, the current government has indicated its strategic focus is its immediate neighbourhood. Australia, on the other hand, continues to play an active role in the FPDA. Indeed, whereas during the Suharto era, when some Australian commentators had suggested that the country's involvement in the FPDA might be a disincentive with regards to closer Canberra-Jakarta ties, the situation today may be the opposite. The FPDA continues to provide Australia with a regional presence.

In sum, the FPDA has not faced any major challenge since its inception because of two principal reasons. First, its purpose and design were pragmatic, demanding not too much from its "coalition of the willing". Secondly, Indonesia under Suharto had chosen to accommodate the FPDA which in turn has always been sensitive to Jakarta, such as conducting its major maritime exercises in the South China Sea. But circumstances can change. The very fact of its flexible arrangement means that any member who has become "less willing" can leave the FPDA, thus weakening both the indivisible defence of peninsular Malaysia and Singapore element and the so-called psychological deterrence element. Conceivably, a more assertive Indonesia may in future raise questions about the FPDA's relevance.

Conclusion

The FPDA is an example of the "if it ain't broke" phenomenon, discussed in this paper. It has played an important role in the stability and regional security of maritime Southeast Asia. The major concern of regional security analysts today is whether the two important bilateral US security treaties with Japan and South Korea will survive. Already, the trilateral ANZUS alliance has been allowed to languish, although US-Australian security cooperation is still sustained. If the FPDA were to lapse, it will be missed. Once broke, it can never be fixed. “

This paper was presented as part of the ASEAN Regional Forum's professional development programme for foreign affairs and defence officials held in Brunei Darussalam from 23 to 28 April 2000.

 Rujukan: 1 Singapore Ministry of Defence Fact Sheet, 22 August 1988.
                  2 Straits Times, 23 April 1991.
                   3 Stephen Cimbala, Military Persuasion, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University       Press, 1994, p. 21.
                      4 Mochtar Kusuma-atmadja, "Some Thoughts on ASEAN Security Cooperation: An Indonesian Perspective," Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 1990, p. 170.