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Monday, June 13, 2011

Third Indochina War.....


The Sino–Vietnamese War also known as the Third Indochina War, was a brief but bloody border war fought in 1979 between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The PRC launched the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which ended the reign of the PRC-backed Khmer Rouge, and Vietnamese raids in Chinese territory near the border. After a brief incursion into Northern Vietnam, PRC troops withdrew about a month later. Both sides claimed victory in the last of the Indochina Wars of the twentieth century; practically speaking, ugh, since Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia until 1989 it can be said that the PRC failed to achieve their goal of dissuading Vietnam from involvement in Cambodia.

Historical background

France Vs Vietnam: First Indochina War

Vietnam first became a French colony when France invaded in 1858. By the 1880s, the French had expanded their sphere of influence in Southeast Asia to include all of Vietnam, and by 1893 both Laos and Cambodia had become French colonies as well.[5] Rebellions against the French colonial power were common up to World War I. The European war heightened revolutionary sentiment in Southeast Asia, and the independence-minded population rallied around revolutionaries such as Ho Chi Minh and others, including royalists.
Prior to their attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese occupied French Indochina.[6] [7] The Japanese surrender in 1945 created a power vacuum in Indochina, as the various political factions scrambled for control.
The events leading to the First Indochina War are subject to historical contention.[8] When the Viet Minh hastily sought to establish the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the remaining French at first welcomed the new regime, but then staged a coup to regain their control.[7][9] The Kuomintang supported French restoration, but Viet Minh efforts towards independence were backed by Chinese communists. The Soviet Union at first supported French hegemony, but later supported Ho Chi Minh.[10][11] The Soviets nonetheless remained less supportive than China.
The war itself involved numerous events that had major impacts throughout Indochina. Two major conferences were held to bring about a resolution. Finally, on July 20, 1954, the Geneva Conference (1954) resulted in a political settlement to reunite the country, signed with support from China, Russia, and Western European powers.[12] While the Soviet Union played a constructive role in the agreement, it again was not as involved as China.[10][13] The U.S. disapproved of the agreement and swiftly moved when the Vietnamese gained their independence.

Sino–Soviet split

The Chinese Communist Party and the Viet Minh had a long history. During the initial stages of the First Indochina War with France, the recently founded communist People's Republic of China and the Viet Minh had close ties. In early 1950, China became the first country in the world to recognise the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the 'Chinese Military Advisory Group' under Wei Guoqing played an important role in the Viet Minh victory over the French.
After the death of Stalin, relations between the Soviet Union and China began to deteriorate. Mao Zedong believed the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had made a serious error in his Secret Speech denouncing Stalin, and criticized the Soviet Union's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, in particular Khrushchev's support for peaceful co-existence and its interpretation. This led to increasingly hostile relations, and eventually the Sino-Soviet split. Until Khrushchev was deposed in late 1964, North Vietnam supported China in the dispute, mainly as a result of China's support for its re-unification policy, whereas the Soviet Union remained indifferent. From early 1965 onwards, Vietnamese communists drifted towards the Soviet Union, as now both the Soviet Union and China supplied arms to North Vietnam during their war against South Vietnam and the United States.

US War in Vietnam: Second Indochina War

The Soviets welcomed the Vietnamese drift toward the USSR, seeing Vietnam as a way to demonstrate that they were the "real power" behind communism in the Far East.
To the PRC, the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship was a disturbing development. It seemed to them that the Soviets were trying to encircle China.
The PRC started talks with the USA in the early 1970s, culminating in high level meetings with Henry Kissinger and later Richard Nixon. These meetings contributed to a re-orientation of Chinese foreign policy towards the United States. Meanwhile, the PRC also supported the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The PRC supported Pol Pot from fear that a unified Vietnam, in alliance with the Soviet Union, would dominate Indochina.

Cambodia

Although the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer Rouge had previously cooperated, the relationship deteriorated when Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot came to power and established Democratic Kampuchea. The Cambodian regime demanded that certain tracts of land be "returned" to Cambodia, lands that had been "lost" centuries earlier. Unsurprisingly, the Vietnamese refused the demands. According to Vietnam, Pol Pot responded by massacring ethnic Vietnamese inside Cambodia (see History of Cambodia), and, by 1978, allegedly supporting a Vietnamese guerrilla army making incursions into western Vietnam. However, it should be noted that Pol Pot massacred people of all races, including ethnic Chinese, ethnic Vietnamese and Cambodians.
Realizing that Cambodia was being supported by the PRC, Vietnam approached the Soviets about possible actions. The Soviets saw this as a major opportunity. The Vietnamese army, fresh from combat with the US's ground forces, would easily be able to defeat the Cambodian forces. This would not only remove the only major PRC-aligned political force in the area but also demonstrate the benefits of being aligned with the USSR. The Vietnamese were equally excited about the potential outcome. Laos was already a strong ally; if Cambodia could be "turned," Vietnam would emerge as a major regional power, political master of Indochina.
The Vietnamese feared reprisals from the PRC. Over a period of several months in 1978, the Soviets made it clear that they were supporting the Vietnamese against Cambodian incursions. They felt this political show of force would keep the Chinese out of any sort of direct confrontation, allowing the Vietnamese and Cambodians to fight out what was to some extent a Sino-Soviet war by proxy.
In late 1978, the Vietnamese military invaded Cambodia. As expected, their experienced and well-equipped troops had little difficulty defeating the Khmer Rouge forces. On January 7, 1979 Vietnamese-backed Cambodian forces seized Phnom Penh, thus ending the Khmer Rouge regime.

PRC vs. Vietnam: Third Indochina War


While the first war emerged from the complex situation following WWII and the second exploded from the unresolved aftermath of political relations with the first, the Third Indochina War again followed the unsolved problems of the earlier wars. The fact remains that: "Peace did not come to Indochina with either American 1973 withdrawal or Hanoi's 1975 victory" as disputes erupted over Cambodia and relations with China.
The PRC, now under Deng Xiaoping, was starting the Chinese economic reform and opening trade with NATO nations, in turn, growing increasingly defiant against USSR. On November 3 1978 USSR and Vietnam signed a twenty-five year mutual defense treaty, which made Vietnam the "linchpin" in the USSR's "drive to contain China.".
On January 1, 1979, Deng Xiaoping visited USA for the first time and spoke to American president Jimmy Carter: "It's time to smack the bottom of unruly little children". On February 15, the first day that China could have officially announced the termination of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, Deng Xiaoping declared that China planned to conduct a limited attack on Vietnam. The reason cited for the counter strike was the supposed mistreatment of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese minority and the Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands (claimed by the PRC). To prevent Soviet intervention on Vietnam's behalf, Deng warned Moscow the next day that China was prepared for a full-scale war against the USSR; in preparation for this conflict, China put all of their troops along the Sino-Soviet border on an emergency war alert, set up a new military command in Xinjiang, and even evacuated an estimated 300,000 civilians from the Sino-Soviet border. In addition, the bulk of China's active forces (as many as one-and-a-half million troops) were stationed along China's borders with the USSR.
In response to China's attack, the USSR sent several naval vessels and initiated a Soviet arms airlift to Vietnam. However the USSR felt that there was simply no way that they could directly support Vietnam against the PRC; the distances were too great to be an effective ally, and any sort of reinforcements would have to cross territory controlled by the PRC or U.S. allies. The only realistic option would be to indirectly re-start the simmering border war with China in the north. Vietnam was important to Soviet policy but not enough for the Soviets to go to war over. When Moscow did not intervene, Beijing publicly proclaimed that the USSR had broken its numerous promises to assist Vietnam. The USSR's failure to support Vietnam emboldened China to announce on April 3, 1979 that it intended to terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.

Chinese forces

Two days after the declaration of war, on February 17, a PRC force of about 200,000 supported by 200 Type 59, Type 62, and Type 63 tanks from the PRC People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered northern Vietnam.[20] The Chinese force consisted of units from the Kunming Military Region (later abolished), Chengdu Military Region, Wuhan Military Region (later abolished) and Guangzhou Military Region, but commanded by the headquarters of Kunming Military Region on the western front and Guangzhou Military Region in the eastern front. Some troops engaged in this war, especially engineering units, railway corps, logistical units and antiaircraft units, had been assigned to assist Vietnam in its struggle against the United States just a few years earlier during the Vietnam War. Contrary to the belief that over 600,000 Chinese troops entered Vietnam, the actual number was only 200,000. However, 600,000 Chinese troops were mobilized, of which 200,000 were deployed away from their original bases. Around 400 tanks (specifically Type 59s) were also deployed. The Chinese troop deployments were observed by US spy satellites, and the KH-9 Big Bird photographic reconnaissance satellite played an important role. In his state visit to the US in 1979, the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was presented with this information and asked to confirm the numbers. He replied that the information was completely accurate. After this public confirmation in the U.S., the domestic Chinese media were finally allowed to report on these deployments.

Chinese order of battle

Vietnamese Forces

Many of Vietnam's elite troops were in Cambodia keeping a tight grip on its newly occupied territory. The Vietnamese government claimed they left only a force of about 70,000 including several army regular divisions and in its northern area. However, the Chinese claimed to have encountered more than twice this number. During the war, Vietnamese forces also used American Military equipment abandoned during the Vietnam War.

 

 

Course of the war

The Chinese invaded Northern Vietnam and immediately encountered resistance. The Vietnamese claimed that resistance was offered by a mixture of local militia and army divisions totalling 70,000 troops, while the Chinese claimed to have encountered a much larger force. The Chinese were able to advance about twenty five kilometers into Vietnam. Most of the fighting occurred in the provinces of Cao Bang, Lao Cai, and Lang Son. On March 6, the Chinese took the city of Lang Son. Claiming that the gate to Hanoi was open and that their punitive mission had been achieved, the Chinese withdrew.

Chinese casualties

To this day, both sides of the conflict describe themselves as the victor. The number of casualties is disputed, with some Western sources putting PLA losses at more than 25,000 killed throughout the war.
According to Chinese sources, however, like Chinese democracy activist Wei Jingsheng, the Chinese troops had suffered 9000 deaths and more than 10,000 wounded in 1980.

Vietnamese casualties

There are no independently verifiable details of Vietnamese casualties, same as their counterpart Chinese government, Vietnamese government has never announced any information on its actual casualty, except for Nhan Dan newspaper[21],the Central Organ of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the voice of the Party, claimed that Vietnam suffered more than 10,000 civilian deaths over Chinese invasion, and earlier on 17 May,1979, Nhan Dan newspaper also released statistics on heavy loss of its industrial and agricultural properties.

Chinese debacle


The Chinese military was using equipment and tactics from the era of the Long March, World War II and the Korean War. Under Deng's order, China did not use their naval power and air force to suppress enemy fire, neutralize strong points, and support their ground forces. Therefore, the Chinese ground forces were forced into absorbing the impact of the Vietnamese forces' fire. The PLA lacked adequate communications, transport, and logistics. Further, they were burdened with an elaborate and archaic command structure which proved inefficient in the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area).[23] Runners were employed to relay orders because there were few radios — those that they did have were not secure. The Cultural Revolution had significantly weakened Chinese industry, and military hardware produced suffered from poor quality, and thus did not perform well. China's goal was to force the Vietnamese to pull out their 150,000 troops from Cambodia, where their Khmer Rouge allies were being extremely pressured upon.

Aftermath

The legacy of the war is lasting. China lost thousands of troops killed and 3,446 million yuan in overhead, which delayed completion of their 1979-80 economic plan. The Chinese implemented a "scorched-earth policy" while retreating back to China. They caused extensive damage to the Vietnamese countryside and infrastructure, through the destruction of Vietnamese villages, roads and railroads. The war did not alter Vietnamese policy in Cambodia; the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia was still ousted and replaced by a puppet government. The Chinese were forcibly reminded of their troops' lack of training and tactical coordination.
Border skirmishes continued throughout the 1980s, including a significant skirmish in April 1984; this saw the first use of the Type 81 Assault Rifle by the Chinese and a naval battle over the Spratly Islands in 1988. In 1999 after many years of negotiations, China and Vietnam signed a border pact, though the line of demarcation remained secret.[26] There was a very slight adjustment of the land border, resulting in land being given back to China. Vietnam's official news service reported the implementation of the new border around August 2001. Again in January 2009 the border demarcation with markers was officially completed. Signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Dung on the Vietnamese side and his Chinese counterpart, Wu Dawei, on the Chinese side. Both the Paracel (Hoàng Sa: Vietnamese) (Xīshā: Chinese) and Spratly (Trường Sa: Vietnamese) (Nangsha: Chinese) islands remain a point of contention.
The Vietnamese government continuously requested an official apology from the Chinese government for its invasion of Vietnam but the Chinese government refused. After the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1990, Vietnam officially dropped its demand for an apology.

Relations after the war

A catalyst to improved relations between the two communist countries was the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, at which point Vietnam showed strong support for the Chinese measures, though ironically many Chinese officers who had served in the Sino-Vietnamese War were active in suppressing the protest movement. Borders remained militarized, however.
The December 2007 announcement of a plan to build a Hanoi-Kunming highway was a landmark in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The road will traverse the border that once served as a battleground. It should contribute to demilitarizing the border region, as well as facilitating trade and industrial cooperation between the nations.

Reflections from international and Chinese media

On March 1, 2005 Howard W. French wrote in The New York Times: Some historians stated that the war was started by Mr. Deng(China's then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping) to keep the army preoccupied while he consolidated power, eliminating leftist rivals from the Maoist era and Chinese soldiers were used as cannon fodder in a cynical political game. We were sacrificed for politics, and it's not just me who feels this way - lots of comrades do, and we communicate our thoughts via the Internet, One of the veterans was quoted as such. The attitude of the country is not to mention this old, sad history because things are pretty stable with Vietnam now. But it is also because the reasons given for the war back then just wouldn't stand now.
The Chinese official name for the war was duì yuè zìwèi fǎnjī zhàn, roughly translated as 'self-defense counterattack against Vietnam'.

Chinese Media

Contrary to the views expressed in some major international press, there are quite a few Chinese songs, movies and TV programs depicting and discussing this conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Some of them are quite insightful, albeit from the Chinese viewpoint. These vary from the patriotic song "Bloodstained Glory" originally written to laud the sacrifice and service of the Chinese military, to the 1986 film The Big Parade which carried as far as possible, in the China of the time, veiled criticism of the war.

China and Vietnam: Clashing Over an Island Archipelago

By Ishaan Tharoor Thur
In the realm of geopolitical disputes, the barren Paracel Islands are a far cry from the mountains of Kashmir or the alleys of Gaza. Claimed by both China and Vietnam, the archipelago comprises some 30 tiny spits of land in the middle of the South China Sea with innocuous names like Woody Island and Antelope Reef. No one lives there, nor has there been any evidence that lucrative natural resources lie beneath its lagoons and reefs. But, experts say, at a time when regional economies are booming — and nationalist sentiments swelling — the Paracels and the heavily contested Spratly islands further south remain a flashpoint in this part of the world, where the traditional balance of power is tilting further toward China.
Tensions flared most recently last week when the Chinese government announced it would begin developing high-end tourism on a few of the Paracels as part of an ambitious new plan to draw tourists from around the world to Hainan, a Chinese island province off the mainland's southern coast. But while planners dream of creating a Chinese Hawaii — with the Paracels' clear waters a potential luxury destination for divers — the leaked proposal made Hanoi bristle almost instantly. China has retained de facto control over the archipelago since seizing it in its entirety with gunboats in 1974, but Vietnam has stubbornly clung to its long-standing territorial claims over the archipelago. On Jan. 4, a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman said the possibility of Chinese tourists snorkeling around a Paracel cove "seriously violates Vietnam's sovereignty." Chinese officials dismissed the Vietnamese protests, saying the matter was purely one of China's own economic development.
The spat may be a minor compared to incidents in the past — the two countries fought a bloody border war in 1979, and in 1988 a naval battle near the Spratlys left 70 Vietnamese sailors dead. But it comes amid a steady buildup of Chinese might in the region. Ralf Emmers, an expert on the South China Sea and associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, says the Chinese tourism gambit is a move "to make its sovereignty claims over these islands a fait accompli." Vietnam watchers point to an escalation of tensions since the 2007 completion of a strategic Chinese submarine base on Hainan Island, just over 124 miles (200 km) from Vietnam's eastern shore. The base has enabled Beijing to project its power not only in its own backyard, but further into the Pacific and Indian oceans as well. Last year, China detained 25 Vietnamese fishermen found near the Paracels, who were released only after weeks of demonstrations in Vietnam. Chinese officials also allegedly pressured multinational oil companies to eschew tying up deals with Hanoi to explore for resources in the South China Sea, or, as Vietnam calls it, Bien Dong (East Sea). (See pictures of the China-Vietnam border war.)
Vietnamese prickliness at what many see as Chinese encroachment has led to Hanoi beefing up its own naval capabilities. Last month, it penned a landmark $2 billion deal with Moscow to acquire six Kilo-class Russian submarines. The government is also formulating plans to improve its coastal-defense operations and to better protect Vietnamese fishing fleets. Still, considering China's size and wealth, there's little talk of an arms race in the region. "Vietnam is subject to the tyranny of geography. It's like a mid-sized Chinese province," says Carl Thayer, an authority on the Vietnamese military at the Australian Defence Force Academy. "If the elephant really decides to move, the Vietnamese will be squashed."
Open conflict, of course, is unlikely given the scale of economic integration in Southeast Asia. Sino-Vietnamese relations in most arenas are as robust as they've ever been. But observers are concerned that governments have yet to come up with an effective way to arbitrate this maritime dispute. In 2002, China signed a code of conduct with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Vietnam is a member, pledging to refrain from activities that would destabilize the fragile status quo in the South China Sea. Few parties have kept to the spirit of the agreement. The Spratlys, an island chain far larger than the Paracels, are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and nominally by Taiwan, and resemble a Risk game board with territories grabbed pell-mell over the years in a scramble for land and influence. Malaysia has set up a diving resort on one of its own reefs, while most other nations have military posts on their islands. "The ASEAN model has been more or less useless," says Simon Shen, a professor of international relations at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. "The official discourse is [for claimant nations] to co-develop [the islands], but this is almost impossible given the nationalism the dispute inspires."
In China and Vietnam, in particular, nationalist netizens have pressured their governments to remain firm on issues of sovereignty. Both sides have dredged up archival evidence supposedly linking these clusters of uninhabited rocks in the sea to the glories of ancient dynasties and Emperors. For Hanoi, the matter has become especially sensitive as an array of dissidents — from Buddhist monks to activists protesting bauxite-mining — have taken up the cause of the archipelagoes, accusing the ruling Communist Party of selling out to China with every act of acquiescence. "The Vietnamese leadership is burning a candle on both ends," says Thayer. "They have to balance the reality of the situation against rising national sentiment and hope they don't get burned." Walking such a precarious tightrope means Hanoi — as well as other governments claiming the Spratlys and the Paracels — have to measure their actions carefully. "The real risk in the South China Sea," says Emmers, "is that of a miscalculation that could lead to skirmishes and a clash of arms." As signs of meaningful cooperation are few, most expect this tacit consolidation of interests — including China's economic expansion into the Paracels — to continue. How this chess game plays out may have broader ramifications as the Chinese military extends its clout and influence in the coming decades. "It's an interesting showcase for what the future of Chinese naval power may look like," says Emmers. "And not just in the South China Sea."

David Petraeus

David Howell Petraeus
Born November 7, 1952 (1952-11-07) (age 57)

Place of birth
Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York
Allegiance
 United States of America
Service/branch
United States Army
Years of service
1974–present
Rank
General
Commands held
U.S. Central Command Multi-National Force - Iraq
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth
Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division
3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment
A Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized)
Battles/wars
Operation Joint Force (Bosnia)
Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti)
Operation Desert Spring (Kuwait)
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Awards
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (2)
Army Distinguished Service Medal (2)
Defense Superior Service Medal (2)
Legion of Merit (4)
Bronze Star with Valor V
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
General David Howell Petraeus, USA (born November 7, 1952) is the 10th and current Commander, U.S. Central Command. Petraeus previously served as Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) from January 26, 2007 to September 16, 2008.[1] As Commander of MNF-I, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq.[2][3] Petraeus was the General George C. Marshall Award winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College—class of 1983.[4] He subsequently earned a M.P.A. degree (1985) and a Ph.D. degree (1987) in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He later served as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the U.S. Military Academy and also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University. He has a BSc. from the U.S. Military Academy—class of 1974—from which he graduated as a distinguished cadet (top 5% of his class).
Petraeus has garnered numerous accolades in recent years. At the close of 2009, Foreign Policy magazine profiled him as 8th on its list of “Top 100 Global Thinkers.” [5]. Earlier in 2009, he received the World Trade Center Tampa Bay’s Sam M. Gibbons Lifetime Achievement Award,American Legion’s Distinguished Service Medal, the Atlantic Council’s Military Leadership Award, the Union League Club of Philadelphia’s Abraham Lincoln Award, the National Father’s Day Committee’s Father of the Year Award. Also in 2009, Petraeus received the National Committee on American Foreign Policy’s George F. Kennan Award, the National Defense Industrial Association’s Eisenhower Award, the Office of Strategic Service’s William Donovan Award, the No Greater Sacrifice Freedom Award, and the Congressional Medal of Honor Society’s Distinguished Citizen Award. He was also named as one of the “75 Best People in the World” in the October 2009 issue of Esquire, as well as a Distinguished Member of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.
In 2008, a poll conducted by Foreign Policy and Prospect magazines selected Petraeus as one of the world’s top 100 public intellectuals.[7] Also, the Business Executives for National Security awarded Petraeus their 2008 Eisenhower Award. Also in 2008, the Static Line Association named Petraeus as its 2008 Man of the Year, and Der Spiegel named him “America’s most respected soldier.”[8] As 2008 came to a close, GQ (December 2008) named Petraeus as the “Leader of the Year: Right Man, Right Time”,[9] Newsweek named him the 16th most powerful person in the world in its December 20, 2008 edition,[10] and Prospect magazine named him the “Public Intellectual of the Year”.
In 2007, Time named Petraeus one of the 100 most influential leaders and revolutionaries of the year as well as one of its four runners up for Time Person of the Year.[13][14] He was also named the second most influential American conservative by The Daily Telegraph as well as The Daily Telegraph’s 2007 Man of the Year.[16][17] In 2005, Petraeus was selected as one of America’s top leaders by US News and World Report.
Some news reports have speculated that Petraeus may have interest in running for the presidency. Despite these accounts, Petraeus has categorically asserted that he has no political ambitions.

Early years

Petraeus was born in Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York, the son of Miriam (née Howell) and Sixtus Petraeus. His mother was American and his father was a sea captain who had immigrated to the United States from the Netherlands during the initial phase of World War II.[24] Sixtus settled in Cornwall-on-Hudson, where David Petraeus grew up and graduated from Cornwall Central High School in 1970. Residents called him ‘Peaches’ in reference to his often-mispronounced last name and the nickname stuck with him as a cadet.
Petraeus then went on to the U.S. Military Academy in nearby West Point. Petraeus was on the intercollegiate soccer and ski teams, was a cadet captain on the brigade staff, and was a “distinguished cadet” academically, graduating in the top 5% of the Class of 1974 (ranked 43rd overall). In the class yearbook, Petraeus was remembered as “always going for it in sports, academics, leadership, and even his social life.”
Two months after graduation Petraeus married Holly Knowlton, a graduate from Dickinson College and daughter of Army General William A. Knowlton who was superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) at the time.[28] They have two grown children, Anne and Stephen.

Army career

Education and academia

Petraeus graduated from West Point in 1974. He earned the General George C. Marshall Award as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Class of 1983 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He subsequently earned a M.P.A. in 1985 and a Ph.D. in international relations in 1987 from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, then served as an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the U.S. Military Academy from 1985 to 1987. His doctoral dissertation, “The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era,” dealt with the influence of the Vietnam War on military thinking regarding the use of force. He also completed a military fellowship at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service in 1994–1995, although he was called away early to serve in Haiti as the Chief of Operations for the UN force there in early 1995.
From late 2005 through February 2007,[30] Petraeus served as Commanding General of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) located there. As commander of CAC, Petraeus was responsible for oversight of the Command and General Staff College and seventeen other schools, centers, and training programs as well as for developing the Army’s doctrinal manuals, training the Army’s officers, and supervising the Army’s center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned. During his time at CAC, Petraeus and Marine Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis jointly oversaw the publication of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, the body of which was written by an extraordinarily diverse group of military officers, academics, human rights advocates, and journalists who had been assembled by Petraeus and Mattis.[31][32] Additionally, at both Fort Leavenworth and throughout the military’s schools and training programs, Petraeus integrated the study of counterinsurgency into lesson plans and training exercises. In recognition of the fact that soldiers in Iraq often performed duties far different than those they trained for, Petraeus also stressed the importance of teaching soldiers how to think as well as how to fight and the need to foster flexibility and adaptability in leaders, he has been called “the world’s leading expert in counter-insurgency warfare”.[35] Later, having refined his ideas on counterinsurgency based on the implementation of the new COIN doctrine in Iraq, he published both in Iraq as well as in the Sep/Oct 2008 edition of Military Review his “Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance” to help guide leaders and units in the Multi-National Force-Iraq.

Military operations

1970s

Upon his graduation from West Point in 1974, Petraeus was commissioned an infantry officer. After completing Ranger School (Distinguished Honor Graduate and other honors), Petraeus was assigned to the 509th Airborne Battalion Combat Team, a light infantry unit in Vicenza, Italy. Ever since, light infantry has been at the core of his career, punctuated by assignments to mechanized units, unit commands, staff assignments, and educational institutions. After leaving the 509th as a first lieutenant, Petraeus began a brief association with mechanized units when he became assistant operations officer on the staff of the 2nd Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia. In 1979, he assumed command of a company in the same division: ALPHA Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized), and then served as that battalion’s operations officer, a major’s position that he held as a junior captain. In 1988–1989, he also served as operations officer to the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)’s 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) and its 1st Brigade.

1980s

In 1981, Petraeus became aide-de-camp to the Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). He spent the next few years furthering his military and civilian education, including spending 1982-83 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 1983-85 at Princeton; and 1985-87 at West Point. After earning his Ph.D. and teaching at West Point, Petraeus continued up the rungs of the command ladder, serving as military assistant to Gen. John Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. From there, he moved to the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) and then to a post as aide and assistant executive officer to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Carl Vuono, in Washington, D.C.

1990s

Upon promotion to lieutenant colonel, Petraeus moved from the office of the Chief of Staff to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where he commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)’s 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment from 1991–1993. As battalion commander of the Iron Rakkasans, he suffered one of the more dramatic incidents in his career when, in 1991, he was accidentally shot in the chest during a live-fire exercise when a soldier tripped and his rifle discharged. He was taken to Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, Tennessee, where he was operated on by future U.S. Senator Bill Frist. The hospital released him early after he did fifty push ups without resting, just a few days after the accident.
During 1993–94, Petraeus continued his long association with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) as the division’s Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (plans, operations and training) and installation Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM). In 1995, he was assigned to the United Nations Mission in Haiti Military Staff as its Chief Operations Officer during Operation Uphold Democracy. His next command, from 1995–97, was the 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, centered on the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. At that post, his brigade’s training cycle at Fort Polk’s Joint Readiness Training Center for low-intensity warfare was chronicled by novelist and military enthusiast Tom Clancy in his book Airborne. From 1997-99 Petraeus served in the Pentagon as Executive Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff and then to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Henry Shelton, who described Petraeus as “a high-energy individual who likes to lead from the front, in any field he is going into.”[40] In 1999, as a brigadier general, Petraeus returned to the 82nd, serving as the assistant division commander for operations and then, briefly, as acting commanding general. During his time with the 82nd, he deployed to Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Spring, the continuous rotation of combat forces through Kuwait during the decade after the Gulf War.

2000s

From the 82nd, he moved on to serve as Chief of Staff of XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg during 2000–2001. In 2000, Petraeus suffered his second major injury, when, during a civilian skydiving jump, his parachute collapsed at low altitude due to a hook turn, resulting in a hard landing that broke his pelvis. He was selected for promotion to Major General in 2001.[41] During 2001–2002, as a brigadier general, Petraeus served a ten-month tour in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of Operation Joint Forge. In Bosnia, he was the NATO Stabilization Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations as well as the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Joint Interagency Counter-Terrorism Task Force, a command created after the September 11 attacks to add counterterrorism capability to the U.S. forces attached to the NATO command in Bosnia. In 2004, he was promoted to Lieutenant General. In 2007, he was promoted to General. On April 23, 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that President Bush was nominating General Petraeus to command U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), headquartered in Tampa, Florida. The nomination required, and received, Senate confirmation.
Involvement in the Iraq War
101st Airborne Division
In 2003, Petraeus, then a Major General, saw combat for the first time when he commanded the 101st Airborne Division during V Corps’s drive to Baghdad. In a campaign chronicled in detail by Pulitzer Prize-winning author Rick Atkinson of The Washington Post in the book In the Company of Soldiers, Petraeus led his division through fierce fighting south of Baghdad, in Karbala, Hilla, and Najaf. Following the fall of Baghdad, the division conducted the longest heliborne assault on record in order to reach Ninawa Province, where it would spend much of 2003. The 1st Brigade was responsible for the area south of Mosul, the 2nd Brigade for the city itself, and the 3rd Brigade for the region stretching toward the Syrian border. An often-repeated story of Petraeus’s time with the 101st is his asking of embedded Washington Post reporter Rick Atkinson to “Tell me how this ends,” an anecdote he and other journalists have used to portray Petraeus as an early recognizer of the difficulties that would follow the fall of Baghdad.
In Mosul, a city of nearly two million people, Petraeus and the 101st employed classic counterinsurgency methods to build security and stability, including conducting targeted kinetic operations and using force judiciously, jump-starting the economy, building local security forces, staging elections for the city council within weeks of their arrival, overseeing a program of public works, reinvigorating the political process,[52][53][54] and launching 4,500 reconstruction projects.  This approach can be attributed to Petraeus, who had been steeped in nation-building during his previous tours in places like Bosnia and Haiti and thus approached nation-building as a central military mission and who was “prepared to act while the civilian authority in Baghdad was still getting organized,” according to Michael Gordon of The New York Times.[56] Some Iraqis gave Petraeus the nickname ‘King David’, which was later adopted by some of his colleagues. Newsweek has stated that “It’s widely accepted that no force worked harder to win Iraqi hearts and minds than the 101st Air Assault Division led by Petraeus.”
One of the General’s major public works was the restoration and re-opening of the University of Mosul. Petraeus strongly supported the use of commanders’ discretionary funds for public works, telling Coalition Provisional Authority director L. Paul Bremer “Money is ammunition” during the director’s first visit to Mosul. Petraeus’ often repeated[67][68][69][70] catchphrase was later incorporated into official military briefings and was also eventually incorporated into the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual drafted with Petraeus’s oversight.
In February 2004, the 101st was replaced in Mosul by a unit roughly one quarter its size—a Stryker brigade. The following summer, the Governor of Nineveh Province was assassinated and most of the Sunni Arab Provincial Council members walked out in the ensuing selection of the new governor, leaving Kurdish members in charge of a predominantly Sunni Arab province. Later that year, the local police commander defected to the Kurdish Minister of Interior in Irbil after repeated assassination attempts against him, attacks on his house, and the kidnapping of his sister. The largely Sunni Arab police collapsed under insurgent attacks launched at the same time Coalition Forces attacked Fallujah in November 2004.
There are differing explanations for the apparent collapse of the police force in Mosul. The Guardian quoted an anonymous US diplomat saying “Mosul basically collapsed after he [Petraeus] left”. Former diplomat Peter Galbraith, a paid adviser to the Kurdish Regional Government, criticized Petraeus’s command of the 101st, saying his achievements have been exaggerated and his reputation is inflated.[77] He wrote for The New York Review of Books that “Petraeus ignored warnings from America’s Kurdish allies that he was appointing the wrong people to key positions in Mosul’s local government and police.” On the other hand, in the book Fiasco, Washington Post reporter Tom Ricks wrote that “Mosul was quiet while he (Petraeus) was there, and likely would have remained so had his successor had as many troops as he had—and as much understanding of counterinsurgency techniques.” Ricks went on to note that “the population-oriented approach Petraeus took in Mosul in 2003 would be the one the entire U.S. Army in Iraq was trying to adopt in 2006.” Time columnist Joe Klein largely agreed with Ricks, writing that the Stryker brigade that replaced the 101st “didn’t do any of the local governance that Petraeus had done.” Moving away from counterinsurgency principles, “they were occupiers, not builders.” New York Times reporter Michael Gordon and retired General Bernard Trainor echoed Ricks and Klein, including in their book Cobra II a quote that Petraeus “did it right and won over Mosul.”
Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq
In June 2004, less than six months after the 101st returned to the U.S., Petraeus was promoted to lieutenant general and became the first commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq. This newly-created command had responsibility for training, equipping, and mentoring Iraq’s growing Army, Police, and other security forces as well as developing Iraq’s security institutions and building associated infrastructure, such as training bases, police stations, and border forts. During Petraeus’s fifteen months at the helm of MNSTC-I, he stood up a three-star command virtually from scratch and in the midst of serious fighting in places like Fallujah, Mosul, and Najaf. By the end of his command, some 100,000 Iraqi Security Forces had been trained; Iraqi Army and Police were being employed in combat; countless reconstruction projects had been executed; and hundreds of thousands of weapons, body armor, and other equipment had been distributed in what was described as the “largest military procurement and distribution effort since World War II,” at a cost of over $11 billion.
In September 2004, Petraeus wrote an article for The Washington Post in which he described the tangible progress being made in building Iraq’s security forces from the ground up while also noting the many challenges associated with doing so. “Although there have been reverses—not to mention horrific terrorist attacks,” Petraeus wrote, “there has been progress in the effort to enable Iraqis to shoulder more of the load for their own security, something they are keen to do.”[83] Some of the challenges involved in building security forces had to do with accomplishing this task in the midst of a tough insurgency—or, as Petraeus wrote, “making the mission akin to repairing an aircraft while in flight—and while being shot at.” Other challenges included allegations of corruption as well as efforts to improve Iraq’s supply accountability procedures. For example, according to former Interim Iraq Governing Council member Ali A. Allawi in The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, “under the very noses of the security transition command, officials both inside and outside the ministry of defense were planning to embezzle most, if not all, of the procurement budget of the army.” The Washington Post stated in August 2007 that the Pentagon had lost track of approximately 30% of weapons supplied to the Iraqi security forces. The General Accounting Office said that the weapons distribution was haphazard, rushed, and did not follow established procedures—particularly from 2004 to 2005, when security training was led by Petraeus and Iraq’s security forces began to see combat in places like Najaf and Samarra. Over a hundred thousand AK-47 assault rifles and pistols were delivered to Iraqi forces without full documentation, and some of the missing weapons may have been abducted by Iraqi insurgents. Thousands of body armour pieces have also been lost.[89] The Independent has stated that the military believed “the situation on the ground was so urgent, and the agency responsible for recording the transfers of arms so short staffed, that field commanders had little choice in the matter.” The Pentagon conducted its own investigation, and accountability was subsequently regained for many of the weapons.
Following his second tour in Iraq, Petraeus authored a widely-read article in Military Review, listing fourteen observations he had made during two tours in Iraq, including: do not do too much with your own hands, money is ammunition, increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success, success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations, ultimate success depends on local leaders, there is no substitute for flexible and adaptable leaders, and, finally, a leader’s most important task is to set the right tone.
Multi-National Force – Iraq (Spring 2007)
In January 2007, as part of his overhauled Iraq strategy, President George W. Bush announced that Petraeus would succeed Gen. George Casey as commanding general of MNF-I to lead all U.S. troops in Iraq. On January 23, the Senate Armed Services Committee held Petraeus’s nomination hearing, during which he testified on his ideas for Iraq, particularly the strategy underpinning the “surge” of forces. During his opening statement, Petraeus stated that “security of the population, especially in Baghdad, and in partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces, will be the focus of the military effort.” He went on to state that security will require establishing a persistent presence, especially in Iraq’s most threatened neighborhoods. He also noted the critical importance of helping Iraq increase its governmental capacity, develop employment programs, and improve daily life for its citizens.
Throughout Petraeus’s tenure in Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq endeavored to work with the Government of Iraq to carry out this strategy that focuses on securing the population. Doing so required establishing—and maintaining—persistent presence by living among the population, separating reconcilable Iraqis from irreconcilable enemies, relentlessly pursuing the enemy, taking back sanctuaries and then holding areas that have been cleared, and continuing to develop Iraq’s security forces and to support local security forces, often called Sons of Iraq, and to integrate them into the Iraqi Army and Police and other employment programs.
The strategy underpinning the “surge” of forces, as well as the ideas Petraeus included in FM 3-24, have been referred to by some journalists and politicians as the “Petraeus Doctrine,” although the surge itself was proposed a few months before Petraeus took command. Despite the misgivings of most Democratic and a few Republican senators over the proposed implementation of the “Petraeus Doctrine” in Iraq, specifically regarding the troop surge, Petraeus was unanimously confirmed as a four-star general and MNF-I commander on January 27.
Before leaving for Iraq, Petraeus recruited a number of highly educated military officers, nicknamed “Petraeus guys” or “designated thinkers,” to advise him as commander, including Col. Mike Meese, head of the Social Sciences Department at West Point and Col. H.R. McMaster, famous for his leadership at the Battle of 73 Easting in the Gulf War and in the pacification of Tal Afar more recently, as well as for his doctoral dissertation on Vietnam-era civil-military relations entitled Dereliction of Duty. While most of Petraeus’s closest advisers are American military officers, he also hired Lt. Col. David Kilcullen of the Australian Army, who was working for the US State Department. Kilcullen upon his return from Iraq and based on his experiences has recently published, The Accidental Guerrilla, and recently discusses the central front of the war and lessons learned in Iraq, the father of the surge and other topics with the The Washington Post.
After taking command of MNF-I on February 10, 2007, Petraeus inspected U.S. and Iraqi units all over Iraq, visiting outposts in greater Baghdad, Tikrit, Baquba, Ramadi, Mosul, Kirkuk, Bayji, Samarra, Basrah and as far west as al-Hit and Al Qaim. In April 2007, Petraeus made his first visit to Washington as MNF-I Commander, reporting to President Bush and Congress on the progress of the “surge” and the overall situation in Iraq. During this visit he met privately with members of Congress and reportedly argued against setting a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq.
By late May 2007, Congress did not impose any timetables in war funding legislation for troop withdrawal.[103] The enacted legislation did mandate that Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, deliver a report to Congress by September 15, 2007, detailing their assessment of the military, economic and political situation of Iraq.
In June 2007, Petraeus stated in an interview that there were “astonishing signs of normalcy” in Baghdad, and this comment drew criticism from Senate majority leader Harry Reid. In the same interview, however, Petraeus stated that “many problems remain” and he noted the need to help the Iraqis “stitch back together the fabric of society that was torn during the height of sectarian violence” in late 2006. Petraeus also warned that he expected that the situation in Iraq would require the continued deployment of the elevated troop level of more than 150,000 beyond September 2007; he also stated that U.S. involvement in Iraq could last years afterward. These statements are representative of the fact that throughout their time in Iraq, Petraeus and Crocker remained circumspect and refused to classify themselves as optimists or pessimists, noting, instead, that they were realists and that the reality in Iraq was very hard. They also repeatedly emphasized the importance of forthright reports and an unvarnished approach. “Indeed, Petraeus’ realistic approach and assessments were lauded during the McLaughlin Group’s 2008 Year-End Awards, when Monica Crowley nominated Petraeus for the most honest person of the year, stating, “...[H]e spoke about the great successes of the surge in Iraq, but he always tempered it, never sugar-coated it.”
Multi-National Force – Iraq (Summer and Fall 2007)
In July 2007, the White House submitted to Congress the interim report on Iraq, which stated that coalition forces had made satisfactory progress on 6 of 18 benchmarks set by Congress. On September 7, 2007, in a letter addressed to the troops he was commanding, Petraeus wrote that much military progress had been made, but that the national level political progress that was hoped for had not been achieved. Petraeus’ Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq on Iraq was delivered to Congress on September 10, 2007.
On August 15, 2007, The Los Angeles Times stated that, according to unnamed administration officials, the report “would actually be written by the White House, with inputs from officials throughout the government.” However, Petraeus declared in his testimony to Congress that “I wrote this testimony myself.” He further elaborated that his testimony to Congress “has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress.”
In his September Congressional testimony, Petraeus stated that “As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met.” He cited numerous factors for this progress, to include the fact that Coalition and Iraqi Forces had dealt significant blows to Al-Qaeda Iraq and had disrupted Shia militias, that ethno-sectarian violence had been reduced, and that the tribal rejection of Al-Qaeda had spread from Anbar Province to numerous other locations across Iraq. Based on this progress and additional progress expected to be achieved, Petraeus recommended drawing down the surge forces from Iraq and gradually transitioning increased responsibilities to Iraqi Forces, as their capabilities and conditions on the ground permitted.
Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada argued Petraeus’ “plan is just more of the same” and “is neither a drawdown or a change in mission that we need.” Democratic Representative Robert Wexler of Florida accused Petraeus of “cherry-picking statistics” and “massaging information”. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Tom Lantos of California called the General and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker “Two of our nation’s most capable public servants” and said Democrats feel “esteem for their professionalism.” He also said that “We can no longer take their assertions on Iraq at face value”; concluding, “We need to get out of Iraq, for that country’s sake as well as our own.”
Republican Presidential candidate Duncan Hunter called the report “a candid, independent assessment given with integrity”. Republican Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona stated that “I commend General Petraeus for his honest and forthright assessment of the situation in Iraq.” Anti-war Republican Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska criticized the report while praising Petraeus, saying “It’s not your fault, general... It’s not Ambassador Crocker’s fault. It’s this administration’s fault.” A USA Today/Gallup poll taken after Petraeus’ report to Congress showed virtually no change in public opinion toward the war. A Pew Research Center survey found that most Americans who have heard about the report approve of Petraeus’ recommendations.
On September 20, the Senate passed an amendment by Republican John Cornyn III of Texas designed to “strongly condemn personal attacks on the honor and integrity of General Petraeus”. Cornyn drafted the amendment in response to a controversial full-page ad by the liberal group Moveon.org in the September 10, 2007 edition of The New York Times. All forty-nine Republican Senators and twenty-two Democratic Senators voted in support. The House passed a similar resolution by a 341-79 vote on September 26.
In December 2007, The Washington Post’s “Fact Checker” stated that “While some of Petraeus’s statistics are open to challenge, his claims about a general reduction in violence have been borne out over subsequent months. It now looks as if Petraeus was broadly right on this issue at least”.
Based on the conditions on the ground, in October 2007, Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker revised their campaign plan for Iraq. In recognition of the progress made against Al Qaeda Iraq, one of the major points would be “shifting the U.S. military effort to focus more on countering Shiite militias”.
Multi-National Force – Iraq (Spring 2008)
On February 18, 2008, USA Today stated that “the U.S. effort has shown more success” and that, after the number of troops reached its peak in fall 2007, “U.S. deaths were at their lowest levels since the 2003 invasion, civilian casualties were down, and street life was resuming in Baghdad.” In light of the significant reduction in violence and as the surge brigades began to redeploy without replacement, Petraeus characterized the progress as tenuous, fragile, and reversible and repeatedly reminded all involved that much work remains to be done. During an early February trip to Iraq, Defense Secretary Robert Gates endorsed the idea of a period of consolidation and evaluation upon completion of the withdrawal of surge brigades from Iraq.
Petraeus and Crocker continued these themes at their two full days of testimony before Congress on April 8 and 9th. During his opening statement, Petraeus stated that “there has been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq,” while also noting that “the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and that innumerable challenges remain” and that “the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible.” He also recommended a continuation of the drawdown of surge forces as well as a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation after the final surge brigade has redeployed in late July. Analysts for USA Today and The New York Times stated that the hearings “lacked the suspense of last September’s debate,” but they did include sharp questioning as well as both skepticism and praise from various Congressional leaders.
In late May 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee held nomination hearings for Petraeus and Lieutenant General Ray Odierno to lead United States Central Command and Multi-National Force-Iraq, respectively. During the hearings, Committee Chairman Carl Levin praised these two men, stating that “we owe Gen. Petraeus and Gen. Odierno a debt of gratitude for the commitment, determination and strength that they brought to their areas of responsibility. And regardless of how long the administration may choose to remain engaged in the strife in that country, our troops are better off with the leadership these two distinguished soldiers provide.” During his opening statement, Petraeus discussed four principles that would guide his efforts if confirmed as CENTCOM Commander: seeking to strengthen international partnerships; taking a “whole of government” approach; pursuing comprehensive efforts and solutions; and, finally, both supporting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and ensuring readiness for possible contingency operations in the future. Petraeus also noted that during the week before his testimony, the number of security incidents in Iraq was the lowest in over four years. After Petraeus’s returned to Baghdad, and despite the continued drawdown of surge forces as well as recent Iraqi-led operations in places like Basrah, Mosul, and Baghdad, the number of security incidents in Iraq remained at their lowest level in over four years.
Multi-National Force – Iraq (Summer and Fall 2008)
In September 2008, Petraeus gave an interview to BBC News stating that he did not think using the term “victory” in describing the Iraq war was appropriate, saying “This is not the sort of struggle where you take a hill, plant the flag and go home to a victory parade... it’s not war with a simple slogan.”
Petraeus had discussed the term ‘victory’ before in March 2008, saying to NPR News that “an Iraq that is at peace with itself, at peace with its neighbors, that has a government that is representative of—and responsive to—its citizenry and is a contributing member of the global community” could arguably be called ‘victory’. On the eve of his change of command, in September 2008, Petraeus stated that “I don’t use terms like victory or defeat... I’m a realist, not an optimist or a pessimist. And the reality is that there has been significant progress but there are still serious challenges.”
Change of Command
On September 16, 2008, Petraeus formally gave over his command in Iraq to General Raymond T. Odierno in a government ceremony presided by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. During the ceremony, Gates stated that Petraeus “played a historic role” and created the “translation of a great strategy into a great success in very difficult circumstances”. Gates also told Petraeus he believed “history will regard you as one of our nation’s greatest battle captains.” He presented Petraeus with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. At the event, Petraeus mentioned the difficulty in getting the Sons of Iraq absorbed in the central Government of Iraq and warned about future consequences if the effort stalls. Indeed, when speaking of these and other challenges, Petraeus is the first to note that “the gains [achieved in Iraq] are tenuous and unlikely to survive without an American effort that outlasts his tenure.” Even so, as Petraeus departed Iraq, it was clear to all that he was leaving a much different Iraq than the one that existed when he took command in February 2007. As described by Dexter Filkins, “violence has plummeted from its apocalyptic peaks, Iraqi leaders are asserting themselves, and streets that once seemed dead are flourishing with life.” This is also illustrated by the Iraq Trends charts that the MNF-I produces weekly. The January 3, 2009, Iraq Trends Chart [9] clearly depicts over time, the increases in incidents followed by the sharp decline as described by Dexter Filkens and others.

 

U.S. Central Command (Fall 2008 to present)

On October 31, 2008, Petraeus assumed command of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) headquartered in Tampa, Florida. Petraeus is now responsible for US operations in 20 countries spreading from Egypt to Pakistan–including Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. During his time at CENTCOM, Petraeus has advocated that countering the terrorist threats in the CENTCOM region requires more than just counter-terrorism forces, demanding instead whole-of-governments, comprehensive approaches akin to those of counterinsurgency. Petraeus reiterated this view in a 2009 interview published in Parade Magazine.[141] In a recent interview for Newsweek magazine’s “Interview Issue: The View From People Who Make a Difference,” Petraeus expressed his support for President Obama’s recently announced Afghanistan strategy and discussed his view that reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan should for the time being occur “at the lower and midlevels.”
Promotions
Rank                                                   Date
US-O10 insignia.svgGEN                                                                       2007
US-O9 insignia.svg    LTG                                                                       2004
      MG                                                                        2003
      BG                                                                                    2000
US-O6 insignia.svg           COL                                                                       1995
     LTC                                                                        1991
    MAJ                                                                        1985
    CPT                                                                         1978
    1LT                                                                         1976
    2LT                                                                         1974

Prostate cancer


General Petraeus was diagnosed with early-stage prostate cancer in February 2009 and underwent two months of successful radiation treatment at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. The diagnosis and treatment was not publicly disclosed until October 2009 because Petraeus and his family regarded his illness as a personal matter that did not interfere with the performance of his duties. However, President Barack Obama and top members of his administration were informed. 
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